I may be the embodiment of the very pathology that this collection of thought pieces was designed to ponder. The topic that we are examining here is whether a strange "ideological drift" 1 has befallen the academy such that those who once favored traditionally liberal positions, most commonly advocating the broad interpretation of rights against the state, now seem to show less enthusiasm for some forms of rights, particularly in the area of freedom of speech. At the same time, those traditionally considered conservative have been uncharacteristically urging constitutional limits on government power through the vigorous enforcement of rights, typically involving claims of free speech or exhortations to principles of colorblindness. We wonder what explains the shift.
I am a case in point. I harbor such consistently liberal positions on nearly all issues that an online candidate-matching test before the 2004 election placed me at a 100% overlap with Al Sharpton. I care first and foremost about equality, individual rights and the protection of liberty from encroachment by overzealous and ungenerous majoritarian institutions. Yetwhen it comes to the First Amendment, my sterling liberal credentials show a bit of tarnish. I have always hated Buckley v. Valeo, 2 with its fundamental claim that money is speech. In the spirit of confession, I must also acknowledge that I was the only person I knew who admitted to being deeply rankled by the Supreme Court's invalidation of the federal law prohibiting virtual child pornography. 3 And, yes, my blood boils at the high degree of protection given to hate speech. 4 Does this put me (and others like me) in need of a twelve-step program for hypocrites, or are the views I describe representative of some legitimate, and still liberal, perspective on constitutional law? Must I concede to believing less in freedom, constitutional democracy and individual rights than I thought I did, due to these terrible personal revelations that emerge every few Supreme Court Terms? With the confession out of the way, I wish to devote the remainder of this brief essay to exploring how a liberal might, without hypocrisy -and without rights skepticism -defend these seemingly inconsistent positions regarding individual rights and government regulation.
We all recognize that different visions of democracy can be defended, even under the single American Constitution. Because that document and its history encompass so many strands of political thought, interwoven to create a complex democratic fabric, one can find threads of liberalism, pluralism, majoritarianism, republicanism, and any number of other -isms plausibly included among our country's basic commitments. This richness gives rise to lively debates in constitutional scholarship, and leads to radically different interpretative theories about what the democracy requires. 5 Even if one selects liberalism as the dominant spirit underlying our constitutional democracy, one has by no means ended the inquiry, as liberalism itself does not comprise a unified set of commitments or understandings about the entailments of democracy. As the stated topic of our discussion suggests, it is common to assume a general correlation between "liberal" thought and hostility to government regulation, along with a corresponding "conservative" hostility to constitutional limits on government power. Characterized this way, the drift that we perceive might be thought to suggest a retreat of liberals from their commitments when they, in keeping with my opening confession, support certain types of regulation in the face of constitutional attack, particularly under the First Amendment.
Over a decade ago, Jack Balkin drew an intriguing parallel between this modern liberal ambivalence toward a monolithic right to freedom of speech and the Lochner-era progressive attack on the similarly monolithic right to freedom of contract. 6 Both represent what he considered to be a "realist" response to an established hierarchy of rights, distributions and values that tends to be unfavorable to the progressive agenda. Depending on the prevailing background societal conditions, a strict constitutional enforcement of rights in the form of mandated state neutrality (laissez-faire, even) -while superficially advancing some tenets of classic political liberalism -can undermine progressive reform and entrench the status quo in a way not compatible with traditional liberal political ends such as social justice and equality. 7 The realist conception of the First Amendment helps to reconcile the tension by denying the exclusively public nature of First Amendment law, collapsing the traditional distinction between public and private power in specific contexts. 8 As the means of communication, for example, become more and more closely associated with wealth and property ownership, the enforcement of speech rights can more and more plausibly be interpreted as a state-enforced monopoly on access to expression. 9 While the state is nominally acting only to protect speech in a formally neutral way, that "neutrality" assumes and facilitates the baseline of significant disparities among private entities with respect to
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Rebecca L. Brown expressive power and opportunity. Realism, then, would see these rights, and the vastly different opportunities for access that they occasion, as merely a part of a continuum of state policy, with no claim to real neutrality. 10 To the modern realist, a "libertarian conception of free speech has served us well in the past, but like all conceptions, it can and eventually must run out of steam and degenerate into a sterile conception that will hinder progressive reform rather than aid it." 11 Balkin's insight, accordingly, suggests one way to understand the phenomenon of the flawed liberal: liberals value rights as long as the background conditions are such that enforcement of those rights promotes their liberal ends, but when social and economic cycles evolve such that entitlements have shifted and the progressive agenda requires a threat to certain established rights, then they back off of a strong notion of individual rights in order to advance their more egalitarian social agenda. It is no wonder that this realist depiction gives rise to a skepticism, not only about liberals, but also about rights themselves. A similar skepticism has affected constitutional discourse since Lochner and is a hallmark of the realist perspective. 12 But perhaps this skeptical view misunderstands liberalism. Perhaps the reason that "liberalism" and "rights enforcement" do not always appear to coincide perfectly is that liberalism is a more complicated set of commitments than the realist story gives it credit for. True, there is one branch of liberalism that views the state's highest obligation as a duty to maintain its neutrality, with rights protection an important part of that commitment to neutrality. There is another form of liberalism, however, that has a different relationship to state neutrality, and thus to rights. These two schools of liberalism, representing two different liberal expectations of government, are sometimes described as "political liberalism" and "comprehensive liberalism," respectively. 13 Painting with a broad brush, one can contrast these two forms of liberalism by comparing the justifications that they offer for the adoption of a liberal state in the first instance.
The more traditional, "comprehensive liberal" school sees the best state as one that provides political institutions and laws that maximize some other good, such as happiness, human flourishing, or equality and independence. The comprehensive liberal thus implements some philosophical viewpoint and adopts the liberal state as the best way to achieve that commitment. The socalled "political liberal," in contrast, departs from this traditional idea by seeking to avoid the disagreements inevitably raised regarding what the background commitments of the state will be, and thus justifies the state irrespective of any such substantive background commitment. The theory of justice propounded by John Rawls, for example, offers a "freestanding" view of a just society that is not dependent on a background substantive moral theory. 14 It claims to avoid the age-old philosophical battles occasioned by reasonable pluralism; it does so by constructing a state that does not self-consciously adopt or promote any particular philosophical or moral doctrine.
These different teleological commitments between political liberalism, on the one hand, and comprehensive liberalism on the other, have given rise to different views of a state's obligation to remain neutral with regard to competing moral ideals held by its citizens. 15 Political liberalism is committed to ensuring that a state does not privilege any of the competing understandings of the good life, and holds as a core value state neutrality with respect to all such understandings, out of respect for pluralism. 16 The justification for this conviction lies in the recognition that no single principle or ideal can command universal belief among people, and that, therefore, justice requires that none of them be privileged by the basic political institutions of society. 17 This commitment ensures that no controversial ideal of "the good" will be called upon to justify the fundamental political principles under which all must live. Rather, the state will adhere only to the appropriately "political" commitments, such as the political conception of persons as free and equal, while remaining impartial as to the more comprehensive moral doctrines held by private individuals. Neutrality is the required posture for government, with respect both to its ends (not selecting among contested values) and its means (not acting in a way that gives preference to any perspective or group).
For the comprehensive liberal, by contrast, government will be committed to a particular moral objective. The central goal of comprehensive liberalism is to enable the state to facilitate the moral lives of its citizens, and thus to contribute to their fulfillment as human beings. Thus, many believe that the particular conception of the good to which a general comprehensive liberalism is committed must be the promotion of individual self-definition or autonomy. According to this belief, the state's proper role is not merely to leave citizens as it finds them to work out their lives for themselves. Rather, the state may have an affirmative obligation to promote human flourishing, inevitably involving itself in endorsing some substantive values consistent with its underlying commitments.
A state meets its obligation to promote flourishing by allowing people to make real choices about the directions that their lives will take, uncoerced by design or circumstance. It happens that, in privileging this ideal of autonomy, the state will often find it necessary or desirable to remain neutral, staying out of the realms of privacy and conscience. The state stays out, not because neutrality is itself an objective of the state, but because in many cases state neutrality will be the best way to promote the value of autonomy by increasing freedom of choice for citizens. For example, if a state plays no role in religious discourse, citizens will generally have an unconstrained choice about their own religious preferences. This hands-off approach to religion would satisfy political and comprehensive liberals alike.
For comprehensive liberals, however, the obligation to promote overall autonomy as the greatest moral good may sometimes make it necessary for the state to depart from the neutral path. It is in these situations that it is a mistake to assume that "liberal" necessarily is coextensive with neutrality or even libertarianism. 18 For example, if one particularly intolerant religion were to become so dominant in the private sector that people of other religions were subjected to rampant discrimination in employment, housing, and private social institutions, the comprehensive liberal might well determine that the state had an obligation to use government regulatory power to open the doors of opportunity for the excluded groups, even if the result were an interference into the relations of private, indeed religiously-motivated, individuals. It is apparent, then, that political and comprehensive liberalism are not merely two means to the same end. The former sees state neutrality as a defining and constitutive precept, while the latter employs it as instrumental to its own constitutive ideals, autonomy being the commonly identified one.
Both the comprehensive liberal's embrace of autonomy as the goal of the state and the political liberal's commitment to state neutrality reflect the origins of liberalism itself. By rejecting the once-dominant world view that assigned individuals, by birth, to roles in life that placed them permanently in some immutable position in a hierarchical political society, liberalism replaced a belief in natural hierarchy with a belief in natural equality. The liberal innovation saw political society as needing a justification consistent with the premise of equality. 19 Both of these sibling variants on liberalism supply such a justification in their promotion of an ideal of autonomy or self-fulfillment. The point of divide between the two comes when circumstances are such that merely remaining neutral will not permit the state to ensure the attainment of individual flourishing for some citizens. This is particularly likely to arise when unequal power allocations in society permit some private persons to threaten the flourishing of others. When faced with this dilemma, the political liberal must sacrifice flourishing for the sake of neutrality, while the comprehensive liberal will, if necessary, sacrifice neutrality for the sake of individual flourishing. Thus, the comprehensive liberal claims that just as the state has the unique ability and duty to protect life, liberty, and property against dangers posed by other individuals, so too it may have an obligation to use its unique position to counter constraints on autonomy generated by private elements of society. The challenge for the liberal is what to do in the face of a status quo that is itself seriously out of step with liberal aspirations. 20 Comprehensive liberalism comports well with a constitutional theory that places a high value on equality. Indeed, if one posits a thick and robust notion of equality as a starting point for political justice, it may well follow that governments have some obligation, or at least could be permitted under the Constitution, to address gross disparities among persons in ways that a libertarian view would not support, nor would a liberal view committed to unwavering state neutrality. Turning to some of the examples with which I began, the idiosyncratic instincts of the flawed liberal may in fact fall together into some sort of intelligible pattern. I mentioned my dislike of Buckley v. Valeo and its suggestion that money is speech, invalidating a federal limitation on expenditures by or on behalf of candidates. The Court adopted a standard "political liberal" approach to the question, stating that "[t]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment…" 21 The Court appeared to assume that the First Amendment requires the government to remain neutral with respect to the existing distribution of wealth that persons may have available to influence an election. But a comprehensive liberal approach would follow a different analysis. The argument would be that, just as a state must allocate voting strength equally, having, indeed, an obligation to adjust existing apportionments in light of demographic changes not of the state's making, so also a state has an obligation to intervene affirmatively to equalize or apportion political strength attributable to private disparities in wealth. 22 Notably, this is not an argument against rights to free speech or to private property, but rather it is an affirmation of a right to ordered liberty -"the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society." 23 It simply places new weight on the side of "demands of organized society" to acknowledge a legitimate power in government to address serious inequalities that threaten the common good as viewed through the comprehensive-liberal lens. 24 Moreover, the comprehensive liberal approach also provides the foundation for a prohibition of hate speech. The idea is that, if the state's obligation is to promote the flourishing of all its citizens, a primary objective is to ensure that each citizen can participate on equal terms in the informal cultural life of the community, be a full-fledged participant in the moral and social environment, and live a life undiminished by degradation. 25 Thus, while the neutral-state type of liberalism believes that the state's obligation to its citizens is compromised when government prohibits speech on the ground that its content is offensive or degrading, 26 the comprehensive view would suggest just the opposite. That is, speech is protected in the first instance for the
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For comprehensive liberals, however, the obligation to promote overall autonomy as the greatest moral good may sometimes make it necessary for the state to depart from the neutral path.
purpose of promoting self-government, but speech that tries to exclude some from the polity, by claiming that they are of inferior status in some essential way, offends the premise of equality and thus should not be part of the realm of protected expression. An application of Dworkin's principle of equal concern and respect ought, (in my view, if not Dworkin's 27 ) to lead to the same conclusion. Other countries such as Germany, for example, have explicitly determined that the principle of equality should override the freedom to degrade, diminish and exclude from full moral status via speech. 28 A local lower school employs two illustrative rules regulating speech on the playground: One rule is "no teasing," and the other is, "You can't say you can't play." These rules are consistent with the comprehensive liberal commitment to ensuring equal moral status. The teasing goes to the degradation that is analogous to hate speech. The "can't play" rule goes to the heart of what it means to be a full participant in the community. In this respect, the equality principle gives rise to certain entitlements to liberty -the liberties necessary to enjoy full membership in the relevant polity. It should not offend the liberal credo to stifle the one expression so antithetical to self-government -exclusion.
In the end, it seems to me to be unhelpful to focus too much on what liberals would or ought to think about regulation and rights. The real question that the "ideological drift" points to is what we expect from our government, in an age of increasing heterogeneity of both circumstance and values among people. Especially in light of increasing polarization of wealth and poverty, the deep liberal commitments that might naturally lead us to prefer state neutrality in the abstract may now legitimately lead us to question that neutrality as insufficient, or even counter-productive, to the cause of advancing the just society that liberalism seeks to foster. A more robust, affirmative employment of equality principles may be called for to replace the libertarian idea that if the state simply does not legislate harm, the private sphere will take care of itself. In allowing the manifestations of our commitments to evolve in this way, we have not lost our claim to liberalism. Nor have we abandoned our belief in rights. Our flaws, charitably understood, reveal a profound commitment to the central liberal value of equality.
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